Crosshairs -- Military Matters in Review

For want of a nail the shoe was lost.
For want of a shoe the horse was lost.
For want of a horse the rider was lost.
For want of a rider the battle was lost.
For want of a battle the kingdom was lost.
And all for the want of a horseshoe nail.

(From Benjamin Franklin’s Poor Richard’s Almanack)

 I’m not suggesting that we’ll lose the war in Afghanistan if Congress kills the V22 Osprey program. But the idea of cancelling procurement of Ospreys causes a lot of serious questions. Let’s look at this in three parts. First we’ll listen to the folks (besides al Qaeda and the Taliban) who want to kill the Osprey. Next, we’ll hear from the other side. Third, let’s ask some critical questions about the implications of shutting down the V22 program.  

 On June 23, Rep. Edolphus Towns, D-N.Y., chairman of the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee, called for the halt in V-22 production. He said that of the 105 Ospreys bought since 1988, only 47 are combat deployable. He added that on June 3, only 22 of the 47 Ospreys were ready for combat. His conclusion: “The dream of a viable high-speed, long-range, tilt-rotor aircraft has not been realized.”

 Arthur Rivolo, recently the lead analyst on the MV-22 at the Institute for Defense Analyses, said that the V-22 “would fail to meet basic airworthiness requirements” set by the FAA.

 The latest GAO report about the V-22 said that its cost per flight hour is over $11,000 — more than double the target estimate and 140 percent higher than the CH-46E helicopter. The GAO report posed the following questions:

•  To what degree is the V-22 a suitable and exclusive candidate for the operational needs of the Marine Corps and other services?
•  How much will it cost? How much can DOD afford to spend?
• Can a strategy be crafted for ensuring control over these future costs? Can another existing aircraft (including V-22s) or a new aircraft perform all or some of its roles more cost effectively?

 The GAO report concluded that we should evaluate the roles such aircraft play in today’s theaters of war and whether their performance warrants their cost.

 Chairman Towns concluded the House committee hearing by announcing that "the list of things the Osprey can't do is longer than the list of things it can do."

 Sounds like a serious indictment. Now for the other side.  

 Marine Lt. Col. Karsten Heckl, former VMM-162 commander in Iraq, told the committee his Ospreys flew every place and every time they were requested, including daytime combat missions in 120-degree heat. “I operated for seven months and did not miss a mission,” he said.   

 From the strategic point of view, Lt. Gen. George Trautman, head of Marine Aviation, spoke of the U.S. failed rescue of hostages held in the U.S. Embassy in Iran. He said bluntly, “It would have been a successful mission and we probably wouldn’t be where we are with Iran today.”

 Trautman was speaking of events at Desert One, southeast of Teheran, in April 1980, from where the rescue event was to be launched. Of nine helicopters involved, two developed mechanical problems, a third was diverted to help, yet another was damaged on landing. After the hostage rescue mission was aborted and the aircraft started to take off, one of the remaining helicopters crashed into a C-130 with a loss of eight Americans dead and others burned. Several critical factors were involved, but the helicopter failures cannot be denied.

 This brings us to critical questions about the future of amphibious warfare itself. On April 17, Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates said, “We have to take a hard look at where it would be necessary or sensible to launch another amphibious action again. In the 21st century, how much amphibious capability do we need?” Shades of 60 years ago, when General of the Army Omar Bradley, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, earnestly told congress, “Large-scale amphibious operations will never again occur.” One year later, in 1950, the South Koreans were thankful that the United States could land its Marines at Inchon.

 This should make us look carefully at the implications of Gates’ statement. 

• Can we afford to abandon a forcible entry from the sea capability in order to conduct counterinsurgency operations, such as when the Marines made the 400-mile air assault from the Arabian Sea into Afghanistan in 2001? They used the old CH-53 helicopters.  
•  Can we conduct humanitarian operations, peacekeeping operations, emergency evacuations and foreign internal defense operations against a determined enemy if we don’t have an amphibious forcible entry capability?
•  Are we thinking of reducing the requirement for a 38-ship amphibious force?

 This leads me back to the start of this column about Benjamin Franklin’s nail, shoe, horse, rider, battle, and kingdom metaphor. What might the balloon observers in World War I have said when they saw flying machines: “Dangerous to their pilots, unproven, expensive, unnecessary because they won’t fit in future warfare.”

 Congressman Towns, admittedly the V22 Osprey has what the media call a “troubled” history, but just what would we replace it with today if we didn’t have it?

 Mr. Rivolo, our pilots don’t always fly by FAA rules. They get paid extra to fly dangerously. Just give them a flying machine and watch them go.

 This column may be forwarded or republished on your website with attribution to Crosshairs - Military Matters in Review by Fred Edwards. Visit http://www.milmat.net for more Crosshairs.