Courtesy of Gary H. Johnson, Jr. This paper was written on 6/27/08. For a more recent article on this subject read Robert Baer's analysis at National Interest.
 
The central issue in the current Peace Process between Israel and its Arab neighbors, Lebanon, Syria, the West Bank and Gaza is whether or not Hezbollah will disarm peaceably.  The answer to the question may prove to be the linchpin of stability in the Middle East.  Israel's recent offering of direct peace talks with Lebanon, a second round of Turkey mediated negotiations with Syria, as well as its Egyptian brokered truce with Hamas in Gaza all seem to bode well for the prospect [1].  Condoleeza Rice's surprise visit to Beirut to pledge monetary and military support for the forming government of Lebanese President Michel Sleiman, that he might fulfill the aims of UN Security Council Resolution 1701, also signals that a common ground may be attainable [2].  Israel's Prime Minister Ehud Olmert's signaling of Israeli negotiability on the Shebaa Farms and Golan Heights [3] as well as his willingness to consider prisoner swaps with both Hamas and Hezbollah indicates a softening of hard line attitudes and also seem to enhance the possibility that a reasonable peace can be achieved [4].  Hezbollah, who claim resistance against Israeli occupation of Lebanon as a legitimate right, following a bloody internal re-ordering settled this May by concerned parties in Doha, Qatar, have received the veto power in the new government which brought Lebanese Army General Michel Sleiman to power [5].  All that seems left to generate a lasting peace is for Hezbollah to disarm and join the political process in Lebanon.  Long considered by the United States to be a terrorist organization, Hezbollah, whose 33-day war with Israel in the summer of 2006 left Lebanon's infrastructure in shambles [6], has now achieved the very real possibility of both proclaiming a victory in its struggles with Israel to the Lebanese people and legitimizing its jihadi resistance in the eyes of international diplomacy.       

Following the devastation of the July War of 2006, the Hezbollah-led opposition, seeking increased influence over the democratically elected Lebanese government's decisions via the veto power, boycotted Lebanon's National Unity Cabinet [7].  An 18-month campaign of civil disobedience followed, a confrontation whose political deadlock guaranteed the resignation of President Emile Lahoud and his issuance of a state of emergency [8].  Desperate to end the political crisis, March 14 and Walid Jumblatt seizing on the discovery of Hezbollah monitoring equipment in the Hariri Airport, urged Prime Minister Saniora to declare the military telecom network of Hezbollah "illegal and unconstitutional" [9].  Recognizing that the declaration would inevitably lead to confrontation between Hezbollah resistance forces and the Lebanese Army, Hezbollah's Secretary General, Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, responded to the charge by taking refuge in the Taif Accord of 1989.  In an open press conference on May 8th, the Secretary General of Hezbollah claimed that the dangerous situation created by Prime Minister Saniora was to be considered "an open declaration of war."  Nasrallah defended the military communications network as a weapon of the resistance, stating "In the July War, our strongest point was control because communication between leadership and field battles was secure, and this was confessed by the enemy."  By dubbing the military's microwave telecom network as the most important weapon of the resistance, Nasrallah appealed to Hezbollah's legitimate right as a Resistance to maintain its weaponry as enshrined by the Taif Accord, listing the weapon in question as the chief source of Hezbollah's ability to drive Israel out of Lebanon in 2000, and as the explicit backbone of Hezbollah's success in the July War.  In this passionate address, Nasrallah framed the factional battles which would rage on the streets of Beirut and into the Chouf Mountain region over the next two weeks as a "guarantee against civil war," claiming that the way forward for Lebanon was through dialogue [10].  In response, the Lebanese Army Commander, General Michel Sleiman, stood down his troops in the ensuing melee, which left at least 65 dead and 200 wounded.

In an uncommon show of proactive concern by the Arab League members, Prime Minister Khalifah al-Thani, of Qatar, organized a reconciliation meeting between the Western-backed Saniora government and the Hezbollah-led opposition forces at Doha, Qatar [11].  In a stance indicative of its military superiority, the head of Hezbollah's delegation to Doha, MP Mohamad Raad, insisted that any talks of disarming Hezbollah would be a No-Go zone of discussion or contention in the conference which began on May 16th [12].  The resultant Doha Agreement, signed on May 21st, 2008 by the Lebanese political leaders of the National Dialogue Conference, in commitment to the principles of both the Lebanese Constitution and the Taif Accord, achieved three main agreements:  (1) the election of the consensus candidate General Michel Sleiman as president; (2) the forming of a national unity government made up of 30 members in which Hezbollah's opposition would hold Veto Power; and (3) a prohibition of resorting to violence on internal political matters, laying over security and military authority to the state alone [13].  On learning of the cessation of hostilities in Beirut, the acting UN Security Council President, UK Ambassador John Sawers, welcomed the signing of the DOHA agreement as a step toward peace and unity [14].  The attendance of a broad range of international heads of state at Michel Sleiman's Presidential Inauguration demonstrated the world-wide commitment to Peace in Lebanon , notable among them President Assad of Syria, who originally appointed Sleiman to the Lebanese Army post during the Syrian occupation of Lebanon.  American President George W. Bush, upon news of the election win, contacted the President Sleiman, congratulated him and reminded him of his obligations to the UN Peace charters in shaping the peace of the region [15]

In modern context, the Doha Agreement's legacy and possibilities for peace in the able hands of President Sleiman are best illuminated in terms of the Israeli-Lebanon exchange at the signing of the UN Resolution 1701.  At the adoption of the Resolution in August of 2006, Tarek Mitri, Minister of Culture and Special Envoy of the Government of Lebanon closed his remarks on the July War by noting that "the 2002 Arab Summit in Beirut had called for a just, comprehensive, and lasting peace based on the principle of land for peace, which was the way forward.  However, a political solution could not be implemented as long as Israel continued to occupy Arab land in Lebanon, Gaza, the West Bank and the Golan Heights."  To this assertion, Israeli Foreign Minister, Dan Gillerman responded, "the clear path forward was by disarming and disbanding Hezbollah and the other militias, as well as by Lebanon's exercise of authority over all of its territory" [16].  When seen in this light, the Doha Agreement's terms when added to Prime Minister Ehud Olmert's recent willingness to discuss the return of the Shebaa Farms and the Golan Heights to a UN mediated Arab sovereignty and his emerging conciliatory positions on stability in the West Bank and Gaza, it becomes clear that Israel's stance has acquiesced, at long last, to the implementation of a political solution on par with the 2002 Arab Summit.

The question of whether a political solution exists in the Arab-Israeli peace process seems to be drawing to its own conclusion.  In terms of prisoner exchanges and rogue rocket attacks, there are many wrinkles for the diplomats involved in the process to iron out in their quest for stability in the war-torn region.  Coining the Doha Agreement "a victory for all Lebanese," the usually firebrand speech of Nasrallah softens following President Sleiman's election when the Hezbollah leader remarked "We don't want to have control over Lebanon or to impose our ideas on the people of Lebanon, because we believe Lebanon to be a special and diverse country that needs the collaboration of everyone" [17].  This reconciliatory attitude and Condoleeza Rice's announcement of a 400 million dollar US arms and training commitment to the nascent Lebanese Government of President Sleiman, pledged in good faith that the Lebanese Army might take full control of its entire territory per UN Resolution 1701, indicate that both law and order are on Lebanon's horizon.  With the promise of a Shebaa Farms concession by Israel looming -- the need for an armed Hezbollah Resistance, built on the pretext of struggle against Israeli occupation of Lebanese territory, is slowly washing into the Mediterranean Sea.  Many positive elements are beginning to lend themselves to a complete Hezbollah victory, a victory whose most powerful manifestation may lie in disarmament. 

The legacy of Doha will play out in Islamic fashion - under the shade of spears.  With 30,000 to 50,000 katyusha rockets now in his arsenal, Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, it seems, is positioned to challenge Western history's push to write off the Hezbollah resistance as a terrorist organization.  Ironically, due in large part to the Doha Agreement, the time seems to be nearing when Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah will have to make a fateful choice.  If the Hezbollah resistance achieves both its internal and regional objectives; namely, the unifying of the Nation of Lebanon and the forcing of a complete Israeli withdrawal from Lebanese soil, the jihadi movement will have earned a landmark opportunity to lay down its arms with honor and integrity, an outcome to the trials of the day whose distinctly Shia reverberations would rattle the gilded cages of Western foreign policy for decades, whilst legitimizing Hezbollah's Islamist adherents as Freedom Fighters.

Notes:
[1]     http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/israel_palestine_lebanon_syria_hopes_meet_reality
[2]     http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/23ee2484-3bc6-11dd-9cb2-0000779fd2ac.html
[3]     http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2008/06/19/2279141.htm
[4]     http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2008/jun/20/olmert-says-truce-with-hamas-fragile/
[5]     http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/meast/05/26/lebanon.nasrallah/index.html
[6]     http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/07/29/AR2006072901107.html
[7]     http://origin.foxnews.com/wires/2006Dec07/0,4670,Lebanon,00.html
[8]     http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/story/2007/11/24/ST2007112400133.html
[9]     http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/JE14Ak03.html
[10]   http://www.nowlebanon.com/NewsArticleDetails.aspx?ID=41551
[11]   http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=42504
[12]   http://yalibnan.com/site/archives/2008/05/hezbollah_arms_1.php
[13]   http://www.nowlebanon.com/NewsArticleDetails.aspx?ID=44023&MID=115&PID=2
[14]   http://www.unmultimedia.org/radio/english/detail/9706.html
[15]   http://www.nowlebanon.com/NewsArticleDetails.aspx?ID=44719
[16]   http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8808.doc.htm
[17]   http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/meast/05/26/lebanon.nasrallah/index.html