In a July report to the U.S. Military Academy (USMA), retired Army General Barry R. McCaffrey made a bleak assessment of Afghanistan. First, he noted that "Afghanistan is in misery," with citizens who have a life expectancy of 44 years, 68 percent of whom have never known peace. They have suffered a 34 percent increase in violence so far this year, while battle casualty counts for U.S. troops have surged beyond those in Iraq. In addition, the following facts are predicted to worsen in the next 24 months: 2.8 million refugees, unemployment at 40 percent, poverty at 41 percent, acute food shortages, inflation at 12 percent, an illicit $4-billion opium and heroin industry, and mostly corrupt governments at province and district level. 

McCaffrey, adjunct professor of international affairs at USMA, added that the Afghanis reject the Taliban but have no faith that their government will protect them or provide basic services. Although they trust U.S. military forces, they have little confidence in America's NATO allies. The employable NATO forces, however, and the Afghan National Army are undefeatable in battle. Consequently, the Taliban will commit more terrorism against the people and the Afghan National Police. This means that military force must be strongly augmented by economic and political support from the United States and other nations. And the time is now because 2009 promises to be a year of decision.

To complicate matters, effective coordination of political and military organizations in the theater is nonexistent. No single military headquarters exists in practicality. NATO military forces are fragmented because different countries interpose different operational restrictions. An accepted combined NATO-Afghan military headquarters has not been formed. U.S. forces report to varying headquarters. In addition, no body exists to coordinate Afghanistan's government with the many agencies of the United Nations, NATO, the 26 allied nations operating within Afghanistan, and the hundreds of non-governmental organizations and private contractors.

How did we get here?

The attacks of 9/11 sprang, in part, from al Qaeda's leadership and its training camps in Afghanistan, so President George W. Bush determined to destroy or neutralize al Qaeda before it could strike again. Timeliness and lack of staging areas precluded an invasion, so the United States cobbled together several hundred special operations troops and CIA personnel, along with tremendous air power, and millions of dollars, to enlist the support of various insurgent troops. The initial goal was to unseat the ruling Taliban in order to ferret out the al Qaeda that operated under their wings. Within two months, the Taliban had left the cities, dispersed, and planned to hold enough of the countryside to maintain their political influence. It appears, however, that the command cell of al Qaeda escaped and slipped across the border into Pakistan. So the United States and NATO maintained a presence in Afghanistan to prevent al Qaeda from returning. In response, the enemy has become more than just al Qaeda or Taliban. The new U.S. commander of NATO's International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), General David McKiernan, calls it a "nexus of insurgency," while other officers describe it as a syndicate of insurgents and criminal groups.           

Where are we going?

Helmand Province produces half of Afghanistan's illegal opium poppy crop. To combat this, Gulab Mangal, the governor, plans to halt the problem before the poppies are planted, grow, and have to be eradicated. The simple-sounding solution is to give the farmers a food crop to cultivate. They might be influenced to make the change, but the governor's task is formidable. He first has to get the seeds, but he also has to find funding to build new roads to get the legal crops to market. He also must strictly enforce the laws against poppy growing. And, most important, he must eliminate the official corruption that has energized the drug trade. The plan has succeeded in more peaceful parts of the country, but five districts of 13 in Helmand Province are controlled by insurgents, and three more have a minimal government presence.

Unlike the war in Iraq, the majority of U.S. military and civilian officials -- and even much of the mainstream media -- see the struggle in Afghanistan as a must-win situation. One assessment, for example, proposes a military campaign plan of five to 10 years. Gen. McKiernan has said that he needs three more combat brigades, in addition to an extra brigade already promised for early next year. As mentioned above, a powerful force being built is the Afghan army, which is scheduled to double from 66,000 to 134,000 in the next three years. Growing the army will require up to 2,300 more American trainers.

Also as mentioned above, McKiernan calls for additional military forces, but in addition he wants to build governance, develop the economic infrastructure, and increase coordination at all levels, including closer liaison with neighboring Pakistan. General Dan K. McNeil, the outgoing ISAF commander, said counterinsurgency doctrine would require 400,000 troops to pacify the country. With 32,000 American service members, 47,000 other coalition troops and trainers, and 66,000 Afghani army soldiers, his successor, McKiernan, is short some 255,000 troops.

Perhaps technology can reduce the need for so many troops. Defense Secretary Robert Gates has proposed to spend an extra $1.3-billion on ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance) to precisely target enemy leadership. Gates wants increased employment of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and inexpensive manned aircraft to watch the roads and passes to spot insurgents before they strike. Other ISR sensors can spot enemy infiltrators coming across Afghanistan's borders so that special operations teams can kill or capture them.

Although some of the media say that the Air Force is sand-bagging over increasing the number of  UAVs, daily Predator patrols in Iraq and Afghanistan over the past year have more than doubled, from 12 to 28, and are scheduled to rise to 55 by the end of 2009. Moreover, retired Air Force Major General Earl C. Peck told me that the criticism is unfounded. He said: "The Air Force has been deploying UAVs as fast as the required supporting cast and structure will permit. The controllers must have aviation skills and a thorough knowledge of air traffic control procedures. You can't just fly those things without coordination with all the other air vehicles competing for the same air space. The budget is also a factor but I am told that thus far it has not been inhibiting." He added that General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, which produces the Predator and the Reaper is not keeping up with the workload for its contracts. 

Meanwhile, McCaffrey says that the use of UAVs, along with U.S. air power, has "narrowly prevented the Taliban from massing and achieving local tactical victories over isolated and outnumbered [friendly] forces in the east and south {of Afghanistan]."

It is obvious that the war in Afghanistan, which the Marine Corps commandant calls a "battle" in the long war against Islamic extremism, is going to last a long, long time. Admiral Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told Congress in September: "I'm not convinced we're winning it in Afghanistan," but added, "I am convinced we can."

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Fred Edwards is a journalist and a military columnist. To see his bio and archived Crosshairs columns, visit http://www.milmat.net

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