The high court has given states the green light to pass laws requiring voters to produce photo identification as a requirement to cast a ballot today. See details in the AP story below.

By MARK SHERMAN, Associated Press Writer, 4/28/08

States can require voters to produce photo identification, the Supreme Court ruled Monday, upholding a Republican-inspired law that Democrats say will keep some poor, older and minority voters from casting ballots.

Twenty-five states require some form of ID, and the court's 6-3 decision rejecting a challenge to Indiana's strict voter ID law could encourage others to adopt their own measures. Oklahoma legislators said the decision should help them get a version approved.

The ruling means the ID requirement will be in effect for next week's presidential primary in Indiana, where a significant number of new voters are expected to turn out for the Democratic contest between Sens. Hillary Rodham Clinton and Barack Obama.

The results could say something about the effect of the law, either because a large number of voters will lack identification and be forced to cast provisional ballots or because the number turns out to be small.

Supporters of the law say it's all about preventing fraud.

Indiana has a "valid interest in protecting 'the integrity and reliability of the electoral process,'" said Justice John Paul Stevens in an opinion that was joined by Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Anthony Kennedy.

Stevens said that Indiana's desire to prevent fraud and to inspire voter confidence in the election system are important even though there have been no reports of the kind of fraud the law was designed to combat. Evidence of voters being inconvenienced by the law's requirements also is scant. For the overwhelming majority of voters, an Indiana driver's license serves as the identification.

The law does not apply to absentee balloting, where election experts agree the threat of fraud is higher.

The Indiana law was passed in 2005. Democrats and civil rights groups opposed it as unconstitutional and called it a thinly veiled effort to discourage groups of voters who tend to prefer Democrats.

It was in effect during the 2006 elections when Democrats picked up three congressional seats in Indiana and won control of the state House of Representatives.

Justices Samuel Alito, Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas agreed with the outcome Monday, but wrote separately in favor of a broader defense of voter ID laws.

"The universally applicable requirements of Indiana's voter-identification law are eminently reasonable. The burden of acquiring, possessing and showing a free photo identification is simply not severe, because it does not 'even represent a significant increase over the usual burdens of voting,'" Scalia said.

Justices Stephen Breyer, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and David Souter dissented.

Indiana's voter ID law "threatens to impose nontrivial burdens on the voting rights of tens of thousands of the state's citizens," Souter said.

The targets of the law, he said, are "voters who are poor and old."

Yet Stevens wrote that the law does not single out groups of voters for different treatment. "We cannot conclude that the statute imposes 'excessively burdensome requirements' on any class of voters," he said. That opinion suggested the outcome could be different in a state where voters could provide evidence that their rights had been impaired.

Indiana provides IDs free of charge to people without driver's licenses. It also allows voters who lack photo ID's to cast a provisional ballot and then show up within 10 days at their county courthouse to produce identification or otherwise attest to their identity.

Stevens said these provisions also help reduce the burden on people who lack driver's licenses.

Indiana Secretary of State Todd Rokita, a Republican, praised the decision. "This says to the voter you can have confidence again in the elections because we're doing some of the things the guy at the video store does when you go and rent a video," Rokita said.

Ken Falk, legal director of the American Civil Liberties Union of Indiana, said the court was willing to burden "tens of thousands of eligible voters who lack a government-issued identification while accepting at face value Indiana's unsubstantiated claim of voter fraud." The ACLU brought the case on behalf of Indiana voters.

The proliferation of voter ID laws followed the enactment in 2002 of the federal Help America Vote Act. The law was designed in response to the disputed 2000 presidential election. The law's voter ID provisions apply to first-time voters and do not mandate photo identification.

Many Democrats criticized the ruling Monday. It places "an unnecessary burden on elderly and low-income voters, not to mention other voters of disparate racial and ethnic backgrounds," said Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid of Nevada.

Mary Wilson, president of the League of Women Voters, said her group has never found a problem with in-person voter fraud. "We'd be the first ones out there to prevent voter fraud, if there really was a problem," she said.

Several critics pointed to a footnote in Stevens' opinion to show how far back he went -- 140 years -- to describe the corrosive effects of widespread fraud at polling places, a reference to Boss Tweed's influence in New York's municipal elections in 1868.

Republicans, meanwhile, praised the decision for recognizing the threat of voter fraud. "Today's ruling rightfully allows states to safeguard against such destructive abuse," said House Republican Leader John Boehner of Ohio.

In Oklahoma, Republican legislators said the ruling should help them pass a less-stringent voter ID bill. The Oklahoma House has approved legislation to require voters to present some form of identification -- including a utility bill or bank statement. The measure faces a final vote by the state Senate.

Monday's case was the court's first significant foray into election law since the Bush v. Gore dispute that sealed the 2000 election for George W. Bush. The voter ID ruling, with no majority opinion and four of the nine justices writing, lacked the conservative-liberal split that marked the 2000 case.

Written by Chris Arledge

The United States Supreme Court recently decided Baze v. Rees, a case challenging the State of Kentucky's lethal-injection protocol. The Court's actual decision is of limited importance, and is unlikely to take its place in the pantheon of historic rulings. In essence, seven of the nine justices concluded that Kentucky is free to continue using the same three-drug blend that it and just about every other state uses when executing prisoners. This ruling will not send shock waves through the legal world.

But the case is important for a different reason: the frankness with which Justice John Paul Stevens, the most senior and one of the most liberal members of the Court, contends that a Supreme Court justice is free to impose his own policy preferences under the guise of constitutional interpretation.

For many years, the legal world has debated what role judges should play in interpreting the constitution. According to the originalist school of thought, the judges' role is merely to determine what the words of a constitutional provision meant at the time it was ratified and apply that meaning to the present circumstance. The theory is that only the people through legitimately enacted constitutional provisions have the authority to bind their elected representatives, and therefore judges are not free to create new constitutional provisions to suit their own tastes.

This school of thought has been rejected, however, by most legal academics and judges, who assert that the constitution is a living document and has no fixed, unalterable meaning. For them, the judge's role is to aid the process by which the constitution changes to fit with the times. This means that the Court will sometimes discover new rights that earlier courts had never seen, even when the actual text of the constitution says little or nothing on the topic. For example, the Supreme Court has determined that the constitution provides for a right to privacy that protects the right to abortion under many circumstances, despite the fact that the words "privacy" and "abortion" appear nowhere in the document. In discovering new rights in this way, the Court enshrines new protections that it and others believe are necessary; but it also takes the power to govern out of the hands of the people and their elected representatives.

Originalists have long complained that when the living-constitution theorists interpret the constitution in this way, they are not engaged in interpretation at all, and are simply writing their own policy preferences into the document. Proponents of a living constitution strenuously deny the accusation. But now, one of the foremost practitioners of the living-constitution school has exposed this theory of "interpretation" for what it really is.

In his concurring opinion in Baze, Justice Stevens concludes that the Court's majority is right to uphold the Kentucky lethal-injection protocol because existing Court precedent requires that result. But Stevens also challenges the idea that capital punishment is constitutional at all. Note that this is difficult to argue from the text of the constitution that capital punishment is unconstitutional. After all, the constitution itself makes clear that government can "deprive" persons of "life" if due process is followed. For this reason, arguments against the constitutionality of the death penalty almost always rest on bases outside of the constitution's actual words.

Stevens' argument is no different. Stevens asserts that only three societal purposes could legitimately support capital punishment--incapacitation, deterrence, and retribution--but he believes that none of them actually does so. He does not believe that incapacitation justifies the death penalty because the state is always free to incarcerate prisoners for life without the possibility of parole. He also finds "questionable, at best" the argument that the death penalty is an effective deterrent, though he concedes that some recent studies do support that contention. And, finally, Stevens rejects retribution as a valid rationale for the death penalty, arguing that because the constitution demands that the death penalty be painless (or as close to painless as possible), the condemned prisoner is necessarily protected from enduring punishment comparable to the crime he or she has committed.

There is very little new or important about Justice Stevens' analysis of incapacitation, deterrence, and retribution. All that he says has been said before, and there is undoubtedly room for people of good will to disagree on these questions. But what is striking about Justice Stevens' argument is what comes next: an admission that an analysis of these factors really doesn't matter anyway. According to Stevens, the Court's death-penalty jurisprudence "contemplates that in the end our own judgment will be brought to bear on the question of the acceptability of the death penalty under the Eighth Amendment." That is, the members of the Court have the right to decide for themselves what does or does not constitute a constitutional violation. "I have relied on my own experience in reaching the conclusion that the imposition of the death penalty represents 'the pointless and needless extinction of life with only marginal contributions to any discernible social or policy purposes. A penalty with such negligible returns to the State [is] patently excessive and cruel and unusual punishment violative of the Eighth Amendment.'"

This is a remarkable statement. As Justice Antonin Scalia wrote in his own concurring opinion, "[p]urer expression cannot be found of the principle of rule by judicial fiat." Stevens does not conclude that the text of the constitution compels a finding that the death penalty is unconstitutional. He does not conclude that the arguments supporting the death penalty are so bereft of merit that no reasonable person can believe them. Rather, he simply concludes that in his judgment, the death penalty isn't right. And as Justice Stevens goes, so goes the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Hence, the beliefs of the majority of voters in Kentucky, or the majority of legislators in that state, or of those academics whose studies have found that the death penalty deters murder, or those philosophers who have concluded that some crimes are so awful that only the death penalty can provide a fitting punishment, or any other people who support the death penalty for their own reasons should have no say in the matter. Justice Stevens thinks the death penalty is wrong, and that's that.

We should thank Justice Stevens for his frankness, since dissembling has long cloaked what the living-constitution theorists actually do when they "interpret" the constitution. And what they do is dangerous. Abraham Lincoln once warned that "if the policy of the government, upon vital questions, affecting the whole people, is to be irrevocably fixed by decisions of the Supreme Court, the instant they are made, in ordinary litigation between parties, in personal actions, the people will have ceased to be their own rulers, having, to that extent, practically resigned their government, into the hands of that eminent tribunal." Lincoln's warning is prescient under all circumstances, but it is especially so if our unelected judges intend to irrevocably decide the great issues of the day based on nothing more than their own personal policy preferences.

Far too many Americans--politicians and private citizens alike--have been far too comfortable turning to litigation to achieve societal changes that they could not accomplish at the ballot box. But tactical political victories can have devastating long-term consequences, and a free people should be slow to cede its authority to an unelected, unaccountable judiciary. It is past time to reject the judiciary's claimed right to enforce its own policy preferences and demand, instead, the judges interpret the constitution, not re-write it. If we do not, we may eventually come to find that this country merely shirked one autocracy for another.

Note about the author: Chris Arledge is a lawyer and partner of the firm Turner Green Afrasiabi & Arledge LLP. Chris is a former clerk on the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, has taught constitutional law at California Baptist University, and currently litigates intellectual property disputes.

By: Dana Hull
Mercury News

A state appeals court will reconsider last month's controversial decision that said parents who home-school their children must have a teaching credential.

The 2nd District Court of Appeal in Los Angeles granted a rehearing Tuesday, essentially voiding the 3-0 decision until it rules again. The decision will now allow home-schooling organizations that had blasted the decision to weigh in.

"Wow!" said Diane Flynn Keith of Redwood City, who edits Homefires, an online home-schooling journal. "I think the judge recognized that he hadn't done his homework."

The case centered on a Southern California couple, Phillip and Mary Long of Lynwood, who home-schooled their eight children through the Sunland Christian School in Sylmar. The family came to the attention of Los Angeles County social workers when one of the children claimed the father was physically abusive. The workers learned that all eight children in the family were home-schooled, and an attorney representing the two youngest children asked the juvenile dependency court to order that they be enrolled in public or private school as a way to protect their well-being.

Ruling that the parents had no right to home-school their children because they weren't credentialed as teachers by the state, Justice H. Walter Croskey pointed to a similar 1953 appellate court decision.

The Longs are being represented by the Pacific Justice Institute, which released a statement saying that Tuesday's decision was a hopeful sign. "Home-schooling parents should be treated as heroes - not hunted down or harassed by their own government," said Brad Dacus, president of the institute.

The Feb. 28 ruling was also denounced by state schools Superintendent Jack O'Connell, who said that traditional public schools may not be the best fit for every student.

Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger also attacked it, saying "this outrageous ruling must be overturned by the courts."

Click here for the rest of the story.

This leaves Riverside County Deputy District Attorney John Molloy as the only legitimate candidate going forward...

By RICHARD K. DE ATLEY
The Press-Enterprise

Robert G. Spitzer, whose bid was turned down Wednesday for review of his dismissal from the Riverside County Superior Court, has submitted a letter to county vote officials asking for his name to be removed from the June 3 ballot.

Spitzer, 59, was removed from office last October by the state Commission on Judicial Performance for willful misconduct and dishonesty. The judge appealed, saying the commission failed to look at mitigating circumstances.

While he could not act as a judge, Spitzer's removal was not final until the state Supreme Court decided on his petition for review, which he filed late last year. Word came Wednesday afternoon that the petition was denied.

Awaiting outcome of his appeal, Spitzer had filed for candidacy and was qualified to run in the June election for the bench from which he had been removed. The six-year term for the countywide office ends this year.

"I was very surprised and disappointed to receive an e-mail notification," about the denial, Spitzer said in a letter addressed to Riverside County Registrar Barbara Dunmore. He said the denial means the commission's removal order is now final.

"My understanding of ... the California State Constitution is that as of today I am ineligible for judicial office," Spitzer said in the letter dated March 19.

"Therefore, I am requesting that my name be removed from the ballot for the upcoming June 3 Primary Election, and that no materials be published or distributed," Spitzer wrote.

Spitzer also seeks return of the $8,400 deposit made with the registrar's office relating to the voter education materials.

Robert Pepper, principal deputy county counsel for the Riverside County registrar of voters, said his office had just received the letter this morning and was reviewing it.

One of the three candidates opposing Spitzer, Riverside County Deputy District Attorney John Molloy, filed a lawsuit Tuesday seeking to have Spitzer removed from the ballot, citing the commission's October ruling.

It was unclear whether Spitzer's request is enough to remove his name from the ballot at this stage, or whether it might take a court action.

"I started a legal action that I believed was appropriate at the time," Molloy said today. "It looks like it is going to be resolved."

With Judge Spitzer out of the way, Riverside County Deputy District Attorney John Molloy is the clear frontrunner.  The other candidates will stay on the ballot, but Mr. Molloy is the only candidate with any campaign to speak of.

By RICHARD K. DE ATLEY
The Press-Enterprise

The state Supreme Court on Wednesday turned down Robert G. Spitzer's bid to review his removal from the Riverside County Superior Court bench. The decision apparently ends his 18-year career as a judge.

The state high court decision also throws into question how Spitzer can remain on the June 3 county election ballot, where he qualified to run for the seat from which he had been ousted. The six-year term ends this year.

Spitzer, 59, had no comment. His attorney did not return a phone call seeking comment.

Eight Riverside County judges signed a petition filed with the Supreme Court supporting a review of Spitzer's case.

"It's a very sad day," said one of the petitioners, Riverside County Superior Court Judge Gary B. Tranbarger. "In my opinion, he was an excellent judge."

The state Commission on Judicial Performance ordered Spitzer out of office Oct. 2, saying he had improperly contacted witnesses in two criminal cases and falsely signed salary affidavits.

Spitzer claimed in his petition that the commission's findings were not supported by "clear and convincing evidence" and that commissioners failed to consider mitigating factors.

The state judicial code said the commission's order was not final until the Supreme Court decided on his petition for review, although Spitzer could not act as a judge in the meantime. He continued receiving his pay while awaiting the decision.

One of Spitzer's three election opponents, Riverside County Deputy District Attorney John Molloy, filed a lawsuit Tuesday seeking Spitzer's removal from the ballot.

Molloy claimed Spitzer was not qualified because of the commission's actions. He wanted a judge to order County Registrar of Voters Barbara Dunmore to remove Spitzer from the ballot.

"We're researching what our next step should be," said Robert Pepper, principal deputy county counsel for the Riverside County registrar of voters.

On Wednesday, Molloy said his suit would continue.

"One would assume this is it," Molloy said. "He has reached the end of the process of removal."

Molloy said with the lawsuit in place, Spitzer could agree in court to be taken off the ballot.

"If not, it should be easy for the court to proceed (to order his name removed), given what the state Supreme Court decided," he said.

Another candidate, Riverside private lawyer John W. Vineyard, said the Supreme Court denial should clear what could have been a cloudy issue for voters.

"Assuming that means that Judge Spitzer is being removed from the ballot, it will clarify and simplify the race," Vineyard said by phone.

"I certainly feel very sad for Judge Spitzer and his family," said Anne M. Knighten, another candidate for the office and a Riverside County judicial staff attorney. She said that as a court employee, she could not comment on the lawsuit Molloy has filed.

By RICHARD K. DE ATLEY
The Press-Enterprise

The state Supreme Court today turned down Robert G. Spitzer's bid for review of his removal from his Riverside County Superior Court bench last year.

The decision this afternoon appears to have ended Spitzer's career as a judge and throws into question his place on the June 3 ballot, where he qualified to run for his old judicial office.

Reached by phone, Spitzer had no comment.

The state Commission on Judicial Performance removed Spitzer from his bench last October, citing willful misconduct and dishonesty.

Spitzer could not act as a judge after the commission's removal, but the decision was not final until the Supreme Court acted on his petition for review.

Spitzer and three other candidates are running for Judicial Office No. 18, a countywide post.

Today's denial by the state's high court came one day after one of the candidates, Deputy District Attorney John Molloy, filed a lawsuit seeking to have Spitzer removed from the ballot as unqualified.