The Russian attack on Georgia last month, and what can only be charitably described as its delay in following through with its agreements under the ceasefire, brings into focus that Russia is not the partner that many in the West believed it to be. The speed and coordination of the attack (as well as the detailed planning that such an attack required) refutes the Russian claim that it was merely responding to Georgian genocide in the breakaway Georgian provinces. Georgian troops had not been in action long enough in those provinces for Moscow to have had the time to plan and coordinate such a crushing response. As foolish and ill-advised as the Georgian incursion into those provinces was, the absence of any serious Russian attempt to use international institutions to mediate the conflict further reinforces the view that Russia had been looking for an excuse to attack for some time.

Although this attack has been greeted with shock, it is yet another example of increasingly belligerent and unhelpful Russian behavior. Another such example is the Russian government's seeming use of its controlling share in Gazprom (Russia's largest oil & natural gas company) as an instrument of foreign policy to shut off (or implicitly threaten to shut off) natural gas supplies in an attempt to influence the behavior of certain countries. Russia's resumption last year of routine strategic bomber flights (with bombers capable of carrying nuclear weapons) shows Russia's desire to project its power in a manner reminiscent of the Cold War. Finally, the statement by one Russian official that any country hosting part of the U.S. missile defense system (i.e. Poland) is a legitimate target for nuclear attack, further indicates that Russia is not a country that the West can reasonably view as a responsible partner.

The implication of all of this is that the West must finally recognize that Russia is not going to be a stable Western-style democracy in the near future. Although disconcerting to admit, the West will simply have to acclimate itself to that reality. It also means that any hope that Russia is ever going to constructively work with the West to get Iran to abandon its nuclear ambitions is probably unwarranted. While talk of a new Cold War may be premature, NATO's diplomatic and defense efforts will need to be refocused on managing and containing Russia as far east as possible. Although resurgent, Russia is still not as militarily or economically as strong as it likes to portray. Since Russia's nuclear arsenal means that it cannot simply be ignored, working to weaken Russia diplomatically through various measures should be one general foreign policy goal of the next administration. The dependency of the Russian resurgence on the price of oil & natural gas is another argument for a comprehensive U.S. energy policy that includes drilling for oil & natural gas offshore, in Alaska, and at other points in the U.S., while continuing government initiatives to encourage the production and use of alternative forms of energy. In 2007, roughly one-third of Russia's GDP came from oil & gas. By increasing the supply of oil & gas while lowering the demand for them through the increased use of renewable energy, the U.S. can likely lower the price of Russia's commodities and weaken its geopolitical position. By weakening Russia's geopolitical position, the U.S. can help to restrict Russia's ability to be belligerent and perhaps induce it to adopt behavior more in keeping with international norms.