Over the last 2 months, the world has been treated to a familiar pattern of North Korean saber-rattling. From conducting a nuclear test, to firing off missiles, to declaring that it no longer considers itself bound by the 1953 armistice agreement, the North seems determined to see how far it can push Obama. In the past, bad behavior from North Korea has been rewarded with concessions in an effort to entice the government of Kim Jong Il back to the negotiating table. While the Obama team has been vigorously trying to blame the problems that the U.S. is currently facing on failings of the Bush Administration, few people believe that a Democrat administration would have done anything substantially different to try and stop North Korea from obtaining nuclear weapons. Indeed, Obama’s policy on this issue has been substantially the same as Bush’s was in the last two years of his tenure in office. Whether he realizes it or not, Obama’s foreign policy will be judged in large part on how he deals with North Korea.

If Obama wants to be judged more favorably than his predecessor on this issue, then he needs to accept some realities that many Democrats (and some Republicans) do not yet appear to have accepted. While the recent passage of a U.N resolution condemning North Korean actions signals Russian and Chinese displeasure with Kim Jong Il, those in the Obama administration who believe that it also signals that Russia and China intend to get serious about these issues are bound to be disappointed. What should be abundantly clear now to everyone is that China and Russia do not consider it in their interest to solve the North Korean issue. While the rest of the world would cheer a collapse of Kim Jong Il’s regime (like East Germany in 1989), neither China nor Russia (nor even really South Korea) relish that thought. Such a collapse would likely lead to a massive refugee exodus into China and South Korea , with all of the headaches that would result from it in the short run. In the long run, a reunited Korea would likely put a U.S. ally on China’s doorstep, something that China probably views as a threat. As for Russia, their foreign policy calculus seems to be “if it is good for the U.S., then it is bad for us”. Consequently, while they may not want to see an all-out war on the Korean peninsula, a nagging foreign policy problem that continues to be a distraction for the U.S. is probably seen as desirable by them.

Until Russia and/or China see that it is in their interest to disarm North Korea, they are probably not going to be much help in this endeavor. Consequently, the Obama administration needs to prepare for a Cold War-style containment/military preparedness strategy, with regime change as its ultimate goal. On the diplomatic front, the Obama administration should consider making diplomatic gestures in favor of rearming Japan. Not only would such a move send a message to North Korea (as they haven’t forgotten 40+ years of Japanese occupation), but it will also put China on notice that a no longer pacifist Japan may be welcome once again in the community of nations. A rearming of Japan in the face of the North Korean threat might just be the incentive that the Chinese (who also haven’t likely forgotten their own occupation by the Japanese) need to convince them to provide assistance in the removal of that threat.

In dealing with North Korea, success requires that the Obama administration be forceful and purposeful. Ironically, Obama has more leeway to be tough with North Korea, since the adoring media likely won’t unleash a storm of criticism and opposition like it would have done in response to tough actions by Bush. In dealing with this challenge, Obama has an opportunity to help his Party alter its image of weakness on foreign policy by accepting the current realities and making the proper decisions. On the other hand, if Obama decides to continue to operate under the fictions of the past, then he will deserve all of the criticisms that Republicans and others will heap upon him. The next few months should be very interesting.