Back in August, I warned of the big changes coming in the Obama Administration's Sudan policy ("A 180 on Sudan").  Contrary to previous positions taken by senior U.S. officials, signs pointed to an all "incentives" policy with the genocidal government in Khartoum, Sudan.

Concerns were only heightened by public comments made by President Obama's Special Envoy for Sudan, retired Air Force Maj. Gen. Scott Gration, in recent months.  A Washington Post article ("U.S. Envoy's Outreach to Sudan is Criticized as Naive") reported that Gration had "seen signs of goodwill from the government of President Omar Hassan al-Bashir...and viewed many complaints as understandable yet knee-jerk reactions to a government he trusts is ready to change."  Folks understandably hit the roof when Gration stated - "We've got to think about giving out cookies.  Kids, countries -- they react to gold stars, smiley faces, handshakes, agreements, talk, engagement."  Talk of this cookie doctrine led some activist groups to call for the General's resignation. 

Gration repeatedly clashed with Susan Rice, U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., who was pushing a harder line, during the Administration's policy review.  So Darfur activists held their breath as the Obama Administration announced its long awaited "Sudan Strategy" this week.  The Administration presented a united front, with Gration, Rice, and Secretary of State Clinton at the podium.  The officials stressed a "menu of incentives and disincentives."  Each viewpoint seemed to get part of the loaf.   

Activists gave the policy tepid support.  More than anything, they seemed relieved that talk of pressure and accountability was still in the mix.  But that is actually tough to know.  The details of the policy are in a "secret annex."

As a paper, the policy is adequate, one prominent activist stressed.  Unfortunately, the old maxim people are policy will hold true.  As the "Special Envoy for Sudan will play the leading role in pursuing" Obama's Sudan policy, it's going to be hard to hide the cookie jar. 

The regime in Khartoum has seen special envoys come and go.  Sudan policy has been reviewed and re-reviewed.  The country remains in crisis.  To be honest, the best policy might fail.  But unless Sudan receives top-level attention --the commander-in-chief-- failure is assured.  What's the chance of that?