At first glance, it's puzzling that the Afghan campaign is bogged down, in light of the fact that Operation Enduring Freedom was launched 18 months prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom.  In a few short months following 9/11/01, al-Qaeda was virtually routed and the Taliban had been ousted.  So why is Iraq much further along in its development?  Deeper scrutiny reveals reasons why the Iraqi surge was effective in setting the stage for an exit strategy in late 2011, or even sooner.

There are a few similarities between the two surges.  Both surges were set in motion after situations on the ground had seriously deteriorated.  In hindsight, planners realized that more military personnel and rebuilding teams should have been utilized during the initial phases of both operations.  Of course, most estimates for Iraq were far less than the 500,000 soldiers suggested by Gen. Shinseki.

Unfortunately, it took years for Pentagon strategists to fully realize that troop surges were really necessary.  The surges were required to sharply reduce sectarian violence, ramp up the training and experience of police and security forces, provide force protection, and improve everyday life for civilians.

In 2007, Gen. Casey was replaced in Iraq by Gen. Petraeus, an expert in counterinsurgency warfare.  Last year, Gen. Odierno inherited the reins in order to complete the mission, while Petraeus moved on to Central Command.  Likewise, in a June 2009 shake-up, Gen. McChrystal was appointed to take over the helm in Afghanistan from Gen. McKiernan.  The new commander of multinational forces is applying a blend of hard and soft power tactics to help stabilize the country.

That's where the similarities end and the contrasts begin.  In Iraq, the 2007 troop surge coincided with the Mahdi army stand-down (Moqtada al-Sadr), and the rise of the Sunni awakening councils (Sons of Iraq).  The Sons of Iraq were disgusted with the barbaric ruthlessness of al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and were willing to battle them.  Next, over 300,000 Iraqi Security Forces had been trained when the surge was implemented.  Moreover, Nouri al-Maliki had greater authority than his Afghan counterpart Hamid Karzai.

By contrast, the surge in Afghanistan has just begun to be rolled out.  In addition, there doesn't appear to be a large "Sons of Afghanistan" contingent to assist in defeating and/or coopting the Taliban.  Certainly, the Afghan National Army is assisting the coalition in this mission, but the Taliban continues to receive support from some elements in Pakistan.  One positive, however, is that the Taliban is far more unpopular in Afghanistan than it is in Pakistan.

The Afghan National Army and police forces must grow larger as they gain valuable experience foiling the Taliban and securing the country.  Advocates of an early withdrawal from Afghanistan ignore the fact that a premature exit strategy during a time of fragility could embolden al-Qaeda and the Taliban to attempt a coup that could topple a weak central government.

Third, the Afghanistan surge is more challenging due to a formidable terrain.  Moreover, the nation lacks a modern economy, educated populace, and infrastructure, unlike the case in Iraq.  Afghanistan has also been wracked by warfare for thirty years.  Afghans fought the Soviets (1979-89), and since then the nation has suffered through years of inter-ethnic conflict and Taliban brutality.

Fourth, following the onset of Operation Iraqi Freedom in early 2003, news reports shifted to Iraq, while Afghanistan nearly fell off the radar screen.  It appeared that Afghanistan was on a path toward better governance, reconstruction, and national sovereignty.  Little did the public realize that the Taliban was regrouping and acquiring greater sophistication as it applied lessons gleaned from the Iraqi insurgency.  Recently, the news has shifted back to Afghanistan.

Fifth, Iraqis appear to embrace a greater sense of national purpose than the Afghans.  To a degree, unity among the Shia, Sunni Arabs and Sunni Kurds has been artificially imposed through the years.  Nevertheless, most Iraqis have bought into the concept of a central government that can help facilitate security and stability.  In contrast, Afghans have greater ethnic divisions and place more faith in "all politics is local," due to a distrust of centralized authority.

Finally, can Iraqis sustain their progress following the surge, even as coalition forces incrementally withdraw?  That answer might hinge upon the added experience of Iraqi law enforcement and military forces as they provide security and interact with civilians.

Moreover, there is an urgent need for national reconciliation, an institutionalization of democratic mechanisms in society, and more economic opportunity.  After the departure of coalition troops from Iraqi cities at the end of June, 2009, violence has spiked in some areas, but it doesn't resemble the anarchy that existed in 2006.

Afghanistan's economic development and representative governance can evolve if Afghans feel safe enough to participate in education, commerce, freedom of movement, speech, and other aspirations.  It's unlikely that Afghanistan or Iraq will become genuine pluralist democracies any time soon, but enhanced liberty and stability could help both states to counter Iranian ambitions in the region.

Iraq has many challenges to overcome, but Afghanistan has a much tougher road ahead due to the Taliban resurgence, late start of the surge, opium trade, illiteracy and poverty rate, history of tribalism and the recent controversial national election.

With these difficult circumstances and a tepid, inexperienced community organizer at the helm, no wonder Americans are increasingly divided over whether to stay the course in the place Democrats have always claimed is the legitimate front in the war on terror. Or whatever it is they allow themselves to call the fight against radical Islam.