By: Gary H. Johnson, Jr. | November 5, 2009

An effective strategy in Afghanistan will do eight things. 

The first thing an effective strategy in Afghanistan must do is recognize the nature of the enemy we are fighting – we are fighting a combination of local and insurgent Islamic Supremacists. We are not fighting extremists. The Coalition leadership’s decision to provide a cover like “extremist” to the Taliban and Al Qaeda elements our soldiers are fighting is a mistake. To define the Taliban as “unemployed young men” rather than students of Shariah Law evades the reality that we are fighting against dedicated jihadists. So, the first thing an effective strategy must do is recognize and accept the nature of the enemy rather than evade the reality staring you in the face for the benefit of the left leaning presses of the Western world.

The second thing an effective strategy must do is refuse to accept the idea that the American people do not have the capacity to understand what is going on in Afghanistan, and provide the American people with the names of the Shadow Governors of each province, so that the insurgency and parallel government structures of the Taliban and Al Qaeda become real to the American people. America is a nation of competitive winners, and as a nation our citizenry does not realize we are competing against an organized enemy.  When a Shadow Governor is killed or captured, it just shoots across the news lines and disappears the next day without cheers and applause and praise. America is not rooting for her soldiers on the ground as a result of this disconnect. If a battle, a jihadist suicide bombing, or an enemy position is complex, America should learn of it immediately, so that we, as a nation can learn from our mistakes.  This communication failure of American leaders to provide timely intel about the battles and targets on the ground to the American people, shields America from properly supporting the effort, and is a failure which allows young men like Matthew Hoh, who are in the thick of things, to resign their posts out of confusion over strategy and the objectives of the mission in Afghanistan. America is the capital of the information world, yet we are losing the communications battle at home – and as a result, losing heart – this reality is unacceptable.

The third thing an effective strategy must do is provide the Afghan people with statehood. The reality on the ground is that a mix of tribes and sects and nations and militants and warlords make up Afghanistan. There is no central idea drawing the Afghan people together; in fact, the Durand Line and the borders on the maps we see cross tribal and national aspirations for governance. Therefore, the Afghan citizenry must be given an incentivized vision for the future, beyond Taliban control. The Afghans don’t need hope, they need promise. They need the promise of a home they can raise children in, they need the promise of an education for their children, especially their daughters, they need the promise of upward mobility and a better standard of living, they need the promise of clean drinking water and good health services, they need the promise of being a part of something that they don’t yet see. But most of all, they need the promise of being counted. Right now, the Afghan people are operating in an environment that has known war and terror and upheaval and pure evil and intimidation and fear for the better part of 30 years. Therefore, the third thing that an effective strategy in Afghanistan must do is provide a vision for a Central Census Bureau that acts as both an internal and an external bridge. Democracy is on the ropes in Afghanistan; therefore, what is necessary is a drive to count all Afghan citizens and document their existence in a hall of biometric records, providing them with an identification card and a bank account with 100 dollars, which can be used only to buy food and clothing at government backed shopping centers, with vastly discounted prices. If there are 32 million people in Afghanistan, the massive move would cost 3 billion dollars. This would simultaneously undercut the Taliban’s hold on employment, provide a month’s worth of pay for becoming a citizen, and provide a doorway through which educational and institutional systems could be built, not to mention a massive amount of shovel ready jobs in building government shopping bazaars and roads and logistics. Also, it would provide a means to determine who the enemy is based on documented records in the future, paving the way for good governance and an end to corruption.

The fourth thing an effective strategy must do is provide the Karzai administration with complete sovereignty within accepted internationally recognized borders. The only way to affect this transformation in Afghan society is to establish an Afghan Emissary Institution in tandem with a Central Census Bureau. The best and brightest men and women of Afghanistan must be drawn from all the provinces of Afghanistan to attend an institution which trains them to be the arbiter of local disputes.  At least a thousand men and women should be vetted and trained to communicate the desires of the state to tribal elders, religious leaders, farmers, and merchants. These Emissaries must then be provided with a contingent of protection built mainly of Afghan National Army, with full air, ground, and intelligence support, allowing them to travel to a district to establish the sovereignty of Afghanistan by setting up an Afghan Disputes Resolution mechanism, undercutting the key value of the Taliban to local Afghans, who allow the Taliban to intimidate them into submission, generating a means to the end of establishing security and sovereignty, and providing a set mission and purpose of service to coalition military partners of the Karzai government via Emissary Escort Patrols.

The fifth thing an effective strategy in Afghanistan must do is to implement the eminent domain law that was recently passed in the Afghan Parliament in a just and measured manner in areas of heavy Taliban control, providing shelter and employment for refugees from the areas of high Taliban influence who claim loyalty to the Afghan state, while summarily leveling the Taliban positions and reclaiming the land for Afghanistan’s people, driving the insurgents out of Afghanistan without quarter.

The sixth thing an effective strategy in Afghanistan must do is implement a powerful public relations campaign designed around the eradication of corruption in the Afghan councils, governorships, police, border, and Army personnel. This step would push the idea of a legitimate state government and drive international investment to the region and provide a solid platform to develop diplomatic aims, internally and externally.

The seventh thing an effective strategy in Afghanistan must do is develop an education curriculum in which English is a required language, developing a long term ally in the War against Al Qaeda and other Islamic Supremacists in the surrounding lands.  A campaign for translators must be developed, raising the most fluent English speakers to the level of State Scribes. In this regard, two simple questions must be asked to the American people – how many libraries can be built for the price of a B-2 Bomber? How many books can be printed for the price of one hellfire missile?  When we come to the stage in which we can ask these questions, we will be in Afghanistan to create a lasting partnership with the Afghan state, and mistakes we make in civilian deaths will be matters for poetry and prose rather than public opinion polls.

The eighth thing that an effective strategy in Afghanistan must do to be successful is to equip and resource the military effort on the ground with a new focus on providing Emissary escort patrols with far more support than is necessary.